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Abstract 
Climate change is a global problem that requires decisive action. While numerous low-carbon solutions are available for 
immediate deployment, the world’s largest economies’ deep commitment to fossil fuels and the need for swift emission 
reductions dictates the use of CCS at fossil-based power plants and other large sources. While CCS technology is ready to be 
used today in large-scale projects, several barriers still stand in the way of deployment. We assert that these are mainly economic 
and regulatory barriers that can readily be addressed with well-crafted and targeted public policy. We outline the critically needed 
steps and assess their prospects for adoption in the near term. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change is a global problem that requires decisive action. The latest IPCC Assessment Report highlighted 
its severity and the need to reduce emissions to 80% below current levels in developed economies by 2050. Targets 
for stabilized greenhouse gas concentrations are being revised downwards as our understanding of the scale of 
potential climate disruption improves, and 450ppm CO2eq appears no longer to be a sufficient level at which to 
stabilise atmospheric concentrations. Signs of faster disruption of the climate than the IPCC report summarised and 
its modelled are surfacing each month. Scientists now have documented that the rate and extent of coral loss in the 
Indo-Pacific are greater than expected [1]. Arctic summer ice has hit record lows in the past two years (2007 and 
2008) and is also declining faster than expected [2,3] Sea level rise from greenhouse-gas induced warming of the 
Greenland ice sheet could be double or triple prior estimates over the next century, according to new studies, which 
renders the last IPCC predictions conservative [4]. This faster rate of change is likely to compound the problem, as 
positive feedbacks accelerate the rate of climatic changes. 
 
While numerous solutions are available for immediate deployment to reduce CO2 emissions – including 
increasing energy efficiency, using renewable energy and sustainable biofuels, and halting deforestation – the 
world’s largest economies are deeply committed to fossil fuels and are not likely to move away from them fast 
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enough to avert genuine climate disaster. According to the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information 
Administration, the world’s energy-related CO2 emissions are projected to rise by an astounding 50% from 2005 
levels by 2030 [5]. The largest portion of this remarkable growth is projected to come from the use of coal, and 
mainly in developing countries. While it is both technically feasible and desirable from an environmentalist’s 
perspective to meet growing demand for energy resources solely through increasing energy efficiency and through 
renewable energy, pinning everything on making this change happen in time is a risky strategy.  
 
It is now widely accepted that there is no silver bullet when it comes to curbing emissions: the concept of 
“mitigation wedges” best describes the needed approach [6]. Each wedge represents a technology or area of 
emission reductions. Attempting to predict the exact mix of wedges in the future is not necessarily a fruitful 
exercise, and different policy preferences will yield different answers. What is more important given the scale of the 
needed emission reductions is to implement a variety of sound wedges without placing excessive emphasis on any 
one of them. This is a wise hedging strategy that will not only ensure that costs for any one wedge do not climb high 
up the cost curve, but that other options are on the table if one or more wedges fail to deliver for technological, 
economic or political reasons. While truly renewable sources of energy and conservation measures should take 
preference over fossil fuel use, CCS must also be included in the mitigation portfolio if we are to reconcile likely 
fossil fuel use with climate protection. 
 
Indeed, CCS could become a critical “insurance” technology with the potential to scale up further if deeper and 
faster emission reductions are determined to be necessary over the next few decades.  Sedimentary formations 
suitable for geologic disposal of CO2 are well distributed and located globally with respect to power plant and 
industrial sources.  Assessments by the IPCC indicate that the disposal potential to be very large, possibly as much 
as ten trillion tons of CO2 in deep saline formations alone [7]. While detailed characterizations will be needed to 
determine the precise capacity of specific geologic formations, a small fraction of this potential would be sufficient 
to accommodate several decades’ and possibly centuries worth of emissions. Furthermore, CCS technology provides 
the opportunity for negative emissions when applied to industrial sources where biomass is used as a fuel source or 
feedstock. 
 
Is CCS technology, however, ready to deliver a mitigation wedge? The past two years or so have not been the 
most encouraging in terms of deployment. After the euphoria of Sleipner, Weyburn and In Salah, CCS projects seem 
to have suffered a series of setbacks and cancellations. These cancellations or postponements include large and high-
profile projects such as Statoil’s Halten project in Norway, Saskpower’s 300MW oxyfuel plant in Canada, NRG’s 
Huntley IGCC in New York State, Hydrogen Energy’s Carson and Kwinana projects and, more (in)famously, the 
“restructuring” of the FutureGen project in the U.S. by the Department of Energy (DOE). The rhetoric in many 
circles remains that CCS is an unproven technology that is some fifteen years away or so from being ready for 
commercial deployment. 
 
Are we to conclude that CCS has been off to a false start? Should we question its ability to be deployed as a 
mitigation technology on technical grounds? A closer look reveals that not all the news is bad. Despite the other 
delays and cancellations, as of the first half of 2008, CO2 is being injected into the subsurface at the Snohvit project 
in Norway and the Otway Basin project in Australia.  A number of other plants have been proposed to be built, 
among them Hydrogen Energy’s Kern Country IGCC project in California, Tenaska’s post-combustion project in 
Texas and RWE’s IGCC near Cologne to mention but a few. Almost all of the above cancellations and 
postponements share one common key theme: economic challenges rather than technological shortfalls were the 
dominant obstacles[dh1] (with the exception of Kwinana where the storage reservoir was deemed inadequate). 
 
In fact, first generation CCS technology is ready to be used today in large-scale projects today. All three 
components of CCS – the capture, transportation and injection of CO2 – have been demonstrated at large scale in 
commercial projects [8]. Significant technical and cost improvements are, naturally, expected after wider uptake, 
and combining those components does involve additional operational, regulatory and financial burden. Nonetheless, 
the technological pieces are in place to allow the first wave of CCS plants to be built and operated safely and 
effectively. A number of large corporations that are proposing CCS projects have repeatedly stated that CCS 
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technology is ready to be deployed today, including BP [9] and NRG [10]. The reason for the recent slow pace of 
progress is that the policy uncertainty is too great to overcome high economic premium. Below we examine the 
barriers that stand in the way of CCS deployment, the critically needed policy steps and assess their prospects for 
adoption in the near term with the U.S. as the main focus. 
2. Barriers to CCS deployment 
2.1. Carbon policies 
 
The single biggest barrier standing in the way of CCS deployment is the absence of comprehensive climate 
policies that place a significant market value on avoided emissions. Without such policies and legislation, economic 
drivers for CCS are simply lacking, as there is little other reason to capture and sequester carbon, with the exception 
of niche applications such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR) utilizing CO2 that is relatively inexpensive to capture 
from certain industrial operations, such as fertilizer manufacturing and natural gas processing. For power plant 
emissions, the capital and operational cost of CO2 capture, compression and transportation would be prohibitive in 
the absence of carbon market. 
 
The U.S. is a striking example of how the lack of climate legislation is seriously hindering CCS development. 
The cancellation of domestic projects by Tondu Corp., NRG and others is testament to the fact that CCS will 
continue to linger in relative obscurity absent a price on emissions. FutureGen is no exception to this rule. The last-
minute rethinking of this flagship project – which had often been portrayed as the gateway to a cleaner and secure 
energy future – by the DOE, in the face of rapidly rising cost estimates, outlined in the clearest of terms that 
technology by itself in the absence of the right policy framework cannot save the day when it comes to clean energy 
and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Projects like FutureGen cannot flourish through scant government funding, 
but by leveraging the vastly larger financial clout of the private sector, with reliable public funding as a complement. 
Limited funds from Congressional appropriations and the uncertainty associated with this process are bound to 
shatter progress and developer confidence. The private sector is ready to build its own FutureGens if Congress 
changes the rules of the game. Pursuing CCS R&D in the absence of an overall carbon control regime is futile. 
 
Leadership does appear to be coming from other parts of the world, fortunately. In the European union (EU), 
which already has binding CO2 emission limits and a cap-and-trade system for carbon, proposals are currently being 
voted on to fund CCS deployment using carbon allowances, and for emission performance standards for new 
baseload plants after a certain date [11]. Australia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and its plan to move towards a 
cap-and-trade scheme will provide the much needed continuation to its robust, government-funded R&D program. 
Similar measures and provisions were included in several legislative proposals in the U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives in the 110th Congress. 
 
2.2. Regulatory frameworks for CCS 
The lack of a regulatory framework specifically for CCS increases uncertainty and complicates project uptake.  
Alongside unfavourable economics, it is the most often quoted barrier that stands in the way of CCS deployment.  
The intricacies of permitting capture and transportation facilities are not substantially different than for conventional 
industrial facilities. What is currently causing the most concern and posing the bulk of questions is how underground 
injection of CO2 is regulated. In the U.S., CO2 injection is regulated under the Underground Injection Control 
Program, which has five distinct injection “classes” to permit wells, depending on the nature of the injectate, the 
type and depth of well and other factors [12]. These regulations, even though they have been used successfully to 
permit EOR operations for decades, were never designed with CCS in mind. As an example, the rigorous site 
characterisation and monitoring requirements that ought to be an integral part of any CCS project and largely absent 
as such from these injection classes. 
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Nonetheless, regulators can, at their discretion, require such steps and information of a permit applicant. In 
particular, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has stated that CCS injection wells can be permitted 
under today’s regulations, and that all applications will be processed under those rules until new ones have been 
promulgated. There is wide agreement between stakeholders, however, that a new set of rules is needed for CCS. As 
a result, the EPA began drafting such a rule in late 2007 and published a draft of the Proposed Rule in the summer of 
2008 [13]. With the public comment period ending in November 2008, the Agency intends to promulgate the rule 
between late 2010 and early 2011. 
 
This Proposed Rule introduces a new injection well class – Class VI – for CCS, and deals with a lot of the 
questions that a prospective operator would need to address, such as site selection, monitoring, well construction and 
testing, decommissioning and closure of sites and others. Although the Rule has not yet been finalised, signs are that 
a regulatory framework that will enable safe and effective injection of CO2 for the purposes of sequestration is 
within close reach. There are some questions that the Rule will leave unanswered, however. Those include the issue 
of pore space ownership and its interaction with mineral rights – an issue that will need to be addressed by states 
individually. They also include the issue of CO2 accounting for the purpose of allowances under climate legislation. 
For that to happen, EPA will need to rely on [dh2]additional authority to regulate CCS; not just under the current 
Safe Drinking Water Act for the purposes of protecting Underground Sources of Drinking Water umbrella, but for 
the purposes of preventing and accounting for potential releases to the atmosphere. 
 
Alongside EPA, a number of states are pressing ahead with rules for sequestration. Washington state was the first 
one in the nation to promulgate rules in the June 2008 [14]. At least six more states are close to adopting rules or at 
various stages in the process of scoping and developing them. On the international front, similar or greater progress 
is being made. The EU has proposed a Directive to serve as a framework for CCS regulations, and also a linking 
mechanism to the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS). The Directive would need to be transposed into 
national legislation by Member States. Australia is in the process of debating the Offshore Petroleum Amendment 
(Greenhouse Gas Storage) Bill, which will clarify the regulatory provisions offshore [15]. Victoria is in the process 
of debating a bill for onshore sequestration within its boundaries [16]. Overall, therefore, the world’s developed 
nations are well under way to resolve a good portion of the remaining uncertainties concerning CCS regulation.  
 
2.3. The power-oil industry mismatch and long term liabilities 
Although economic and regulatory barriers amount for the majority of the impediments for CCS, two more areas 
bear addressing. The first relates to the interface between the producers of the CO2 – mainly power producers – and 
those who will be injecting the CO2 into the subsurface – mainly oil and gas and related companies in the early 
years. The bulk of expertise related to CO2 injection resides with the oil-and-gas industry, with little diffusion of 
experience and know-how to the power sector where CCS is most urgently needed and most intensely discussed. It 
is not yet clear who will fill the business gap of storage services: even though oilfield operators and oil-and-gas 
companies are the closest match, to date these industries have shown limited interest in entering this business line.  
Yet, there are signs of oil companies beginning to develop a sequestration services business, while those offering 
services today are moving towards packaging performance guarantees for sequestration projects and services.  
 
The development of the business and contractual interface between the CO2 holders and the disposers is of 
critical importance. By nature, power utilities are risk averse, do not tolerate uncertainty when tasked with 
delivering reliable power twenty four hours a day, and make fewer and more conservative investment decisions. Oil 
companies on the other hand routinely carry a business risk portfolio and are far more accustomed to dealing with 
uncertainty cumulatively. When seeking to invest in a power plant with CCS, utilities will be looking for a high 
degree of certainty on the permanence of storage, the ability reliably to inject CO2 over the operating life of the 
plant, and accompanying contractual guarantees. Any company offering sequestration services will need to be able 
to strike mutually workable agreements with the utilities. We are still in the early days of this process. However, 
despite the seeming novelty of the task, the private sector is remarkably good at providing fast answers to such 
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questions in a competitive and profitable environment. Under the correct policies, price signals and incentive 
programs, this interface will mature much faster that it otherwise would. It is therefore not a barrier as such, but a 
task to be addressed promptly. 
 
Another topic that is frequently flagged as a barrier to CCS deployment is “long term liability”. Industry 
participants claim that investment in CCS projects will be highly unlikely unless a Federal or state agency assumes 
this “liability” from operators after project closure. In fact, legislative proposals at various stages in their formation 
and debate have already included liability relief language. There are several reasons to rethink the commonly 
articulated views about liability and to recognize that the potential losses from ill-considered “liability relief” 
measures are substantial. 
 
First and foremost, “long-term liability” has not been defined or analysed adequately. There are several potential 
liabilities that could arise from a CCS project. Some of these are not liabilities as such, but can be considered price 
risks: the need to buy allowances at a higher price in the future if some CO2 is released to the atmosphere is one 
example. Others would be more properly characterised as routine financial responsibilities, such as the duty to 
monitor a site for a number of years post-injection. The most frequently cited “liability” concern, however, relates to 
tort liability and liability for damages. Lawsuits alleging the contamination of groundwater from a particular CO2 
injection could be one example. According to potential operators, this kind of possibility is stifling for projects and 
is not something that corporations can take on in their books. 
 
This claim begs several questions. First, how likely is it that contamination would occur? Our industrial 
experience with injection to date, both at CCS projects and at EOR projects, suggests that the risks are largely 
known, predictable and manageable. Second, the[dh3] potential for market instruments, such as insurance to address 
some of these needs has only just begun to be explored. The (re)insurance sector is only now engaging in studying 
CCS, and tailored instruments are still largely unavailable, not least because potential operators have not yet 
articulated their needs clearly and little data is available from oil industry operators who have assumed these risks on 
their balance sheet in the past. 
 
Although there are differences between industrial experience to date with EOR or other related activities and 
sequestration, such as different reservoir pressurisation and fluid displacement regimes, or the need to verify 
permanence, the undeniable fact remains that tens of millions of tonnes of CO2 are injected into geologic reservoirs 
each year, without any documented contamination of groundwater or other side effects. The EOR industry has not 
required liability relief to flourish. Instead, operators assumed manageable risks when faced with the rewards of a 
profitable business venture. In addition, there exist no precedents where broad-scale indemnity has been granted to 
industry for activities that entail similar risks to those inherent in geosequestration – CO2 is neither radioactive nor 
toxic like asbestos. 
 
From a public policy standpoint, there is a moral hazard in granting operators broad-scale indemnity. A 
regulatory system should be structured to incentivise sound operations and transparency, and a transfer of liability to 
a public agency could undermine those incentives. Moreover, liability relief proposals would cast doubt in the 
public’s mind on the safety and efficacy of sequestration. Broad scientific consensus points to CCS as a reliable and 
safe technology if performed under adequate regulatory controls, and if sited and operated well [17, 18]. This is 
inconsistent with the calls for liability relief. Public perception stands to be severely affected if industry were 
provided with liability relief CCS activities. The issue of public perception is of critical importance to CCS, both at 
the local level in terms of siting individual projects, but also on a higher, political level, where elected officials will 
be called upon to legislate a policy regime conducive to CCS deployment that contains incentives. A public backlash 
against the technology triggered by liability relief claims can adversely affect the passage of an incentive 
programme, stalling it by many years or even irreparably. This downside needs to be weighed against the potential 
gains from liability relief. 
 
In addition, the lack of CCS education and a long standing mistrust of the coal and oil industries by the public 
and elected officials in some settings have also limited broader support for accelerated deployment policies, driven 
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by doubts on the feasibility and efficacy of geological storage and with CCS being seen as a means to perpetuate 
fossil fuel use. CCS is often portrayed as an experimental technology by sceptics, and as a lifeline for the continued 
use of coal and other fossil fuels that detracts from efforts to shift to a truly sustainable energy system. Politically or 
otherwise-driven industry claims that CCS is unproven only compound this scepticism, and even environmental 
groups that see a role for CCS alongside preferable solutions such as conservation and renewable energy find 
themselves with a formidable task when it comes to education and shaping public perception. 
 
3. Moving CCS from hype to pipe 
Faced with the above barriers, some question the viability of CCS. Fortunately, all of these barriers can readily be 
addressed with well-crafted and targeted public policy. Such policies in the U.S. have been delayed by years of 
opposition by powerful forces in the political arena.  A significant portion of the coal and utility sectors has been 
reluctant to advance the CCS agenda, choosing a strategy of slow exploration rather than accelerated deployment. 
With the ultimate goal of delaying climate legislation, they have put forward the argument that regulating CO2 
emissions is premature until a technology is “available” to control emissions from coal, if the economy and 
consumers’ bills are not to be adversely affected. Technological availability – or the lack thereof – is often presented 
as a reason to pursue a drawn-out research program which would deliver results a decade or two from now. The 
need for CCS deployment is immediate, however. It is clear that the first large CCS projects will not be mainstream 
investments. These first projects likely will require financial incentives as well as the driver of policies to limit CO2 
emissions. Policy instruments abound though, which could address these needs. We examine those below. 
 
We believe that an integrated set of policy measures and educational programs can create in the near term the 
conditions needed to support accelerated deployment of CCS in the U.S. and in other countries. We believe that 
combining an economy-wide carbon market signal driven by cap-and-trade program with specific financial 
incentives and performance standards in the early years, will address the current economic barriers that CCS faces 
and result in multi gigawatt-scale deployment in under a decade from enactment. The market signal is needed to 
provide the impetus for investment in low-carbon technologies. Taking into account though that the carbon price in 
the early years might not be high or stable enough to trigger sufficient CCS investment, additional incentives will be 
needed. In order to provide investor certainty, we believe that the most appropriate form would be a direct cash 
payment for capturing CO2 to be stored in geologic formations whose level declines as cumulative deployment 
increases. This approach would offer the highest incentives to early projects that have not yet benefited from 
technological improvement and learning. Importantly, a stable subsidy that substantially reduces the financial risk of 
early CCS deployment will be essential for securing financing, which will likely be in short supply in a highly risk-
averse financial environment in following this year’s global crisis. In the longer term, CCS can sustain itself under a 
cap-and-trade system without added incentives [19] – but incentives are needed in order to kick-start development 
and technological improvement, something that will render deployment more cost effective. Revenue from the 
allowance market under a cap-and-trade system is the most reliable source of funding for those incentives, and only 
a small fraction of total allowance value would be needed for a CCS program. In parallel with those incentives, an 
emissions performance standard for new power plants would deter continued investment in high-emitting power 
sources, ensure that the playing field is level, and create a needed uniform best practice for deployment of CCS 
technology in the power sector where major emission reductions are needed. An ambitious and reliably funded 
research and development program, which will absorb a small percentage of the deployment funds, will also be 
needed to ensure that the market is well supplied with new and improved technologies. 
 
On the regulatory front, we identify the pore space rights ownership as a high priority item to be resolved by 
states. A CO2 accounting protocol to mesh with a cap-and-trade system should be legislated alongside the system 
itself. Although we do not consider indemnification of operators prudent or necessary in the context of underground 
injection, we do believe that there is a role for a Federal agency in the long term care for injection sites. Taking into 
account the need for adequate regulatory oversight, the need to detect and remediate any problems early and the fact 
that tracking the fate of injected CO2 is a task that may in some cases extend beyond the life of many corporations, a 
Federal agency could be tasked with routine monitoring, maintenance, mitigation and remediation of sites. The key 
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question that remains is how the agency would fund its operations. We believe that an industry-funded pool would 
be appropriate, with both a fixed and a per-tonne component that operators pay into prior to and during injection.  
 
We see the Proposed Rule by EPA as covering several of the necessary aspects of a regulatory framework for 
CCS. In addition to deep saline formations, however, the rule or future regulations should address sequestration in 
oil fields and gas fields. To the extent that corporations want to run business-as-usual EOR operations, they should 
be allowed to do so under the standard rules that have applied for decades. If storage credits are to be claimed, 
however, or if field operation with the objective of maximising CO2 storage is altered to the extent that it creates a 
risk profile similar to that in a saline formation, then those injections should be subject to similar regulatory 
requirements as sequestration projects in non-hydrocarbon bearing formations. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Despite some setbacks and slow progress in recent years, CCS still holds considerable promise as a greenhouse 
gas mitigation technology. Tangled up in a web of reluctance for adoption, uninformed rhetoric, carbon policy limbo 
and unfavourable economic conditions, the technology in the U.S. and elsewhere has been viewed as hype by many 
observers. However, decisive policy action can change the tide and move CCS projects to the pipeline rapidly. 
Political will and decisiveness will be needed in order to institute these policy changes. It is only with this kind of 
will though, that the world will avoid the worst impacts of anthropogenic climate change. 
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